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ABSTRACT
The Android smartphone operating system includes a Java virtual machine that
enables rapid development and deployment of a wide variety of applications. The
open nature of the platform means that reverse engineering of applications is
relatively easy, and many developers are concerned as applications similar to their
own show up in the Android marketplace and want to know if these applications
are pirated. Fortunately, the same characteristics that make an Android application
easy to reverse engineer and copy also provide opportunities for Android
developers to compare downloaded applications to their own. This paper
describes the process for comparing a developer’s application with a downloaded
application and defines an identifiability metric to quantify the degree to which an
application can be identified by its bytecode.
General Terms: Android, Bytecode, Decompiled Code, Identifiability Metric,
Java, Software Copying, Software Forensics, Software Plagiarism, Source Code.
Keywords: Android, BitMatch, Bytecode, CodeMatch, CodeSuite, Copying,
Decompiling, Forensics, Identifiability, Intellectual Property, Java, Metrics,
Plagiarism, Software, Source Code.
1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we describe how to compare an Android application’s source code
with any downloaded Android application to find signs of copying. Many
Android developers, and Android game developers in particular, are finding their
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applications being pirated from the online Android Marketplace (Ciancarini &
Favini, 2009; Hornshaw, 2011).
We had a goal to define a comparison methodology and develop an
“identifiability” metric to quantify how well a downloaded application could be
identified from its bytecode. One purpose of the comparison is to determine
whether a downloaded application was copied from another application, possibly
leading to a copyright infringement charge. One purpose of the metric is to
determine how much of an application’s identifying information can still be
obtained after its source code has been compiled into bytecode. Identifiability can
be a positive or negative characteristic. A program that is easily identifiable after
compilation may be easier to detect when it has been pirated, even if it is
subsequently modified. A program that is difficult to identify after compilation
may hide more of its trade secrets from reverse engineering and theft.
In this paper we present a case study that compares seven different Android
Sudoku games applications and defines a measure called “identifiability” that
represents how well the source code of an application can be identified by its
compiled bytecode.
2. THE COMPONENTS OF AN ANDROID APPLICATION
Some programming languages, like the Java programming language, use a
combination of compilers and interpreters. The Java compiler first turns the
human-readable source code into intermediate code called “bytecode” that is a
combination of computer-readable binary and human-readable text. A “Virtual
Machine” (“VM”) is a kind of interpreter that reads the bytecode and instructs the
computer to perform the appropriate instructions. Android applications consist of
bytecode that is delivered in an Android Package file (APK), a compressed
archive file. Once unpacked the contents of the APK include:









assets directory: This directory contains an unstructured hierarchy of files,
defined by the app developer, for files that are retrievable as raw byte
streams.
META-INF directory: This directory stores signature data that allows the
application to verify that the APK download and expansion completed
successfully.
res directory: This directory is used to store resource files for the
application and includes information for the layout, names, and other
elements used by the application.
AndroidManifest.xml file: This is a required file that contains the
application name, version, access rights referenced library files, etc.
resources.arsc file: This is the binary resources file after compilation.
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classes.dex file: This is the Java bytecode file that will run on the Dalvik
virtual machine used by Android and is not compatible with the typical
Java virtual machine.
To find signs of copying, the APK has two categories of files to examine: the nonsoftware source files (i.e. the AndroidManifest.xml file, the resource files, and the
asset files) and the software bytecode (i.e. the classes.dex file).
3. EXAMINING THE NON-SOFTWARE SOURCE FILES
3.1 AndroidManifest.xml Files
To extract the manifest file in a readable form, we used the apktool (Google Code,
2011b) program. The extracted manifest file content is described in the Android
developer documentation (Android Developers, 2012a):
Among other things, the manifest does the following:











It names the Java package for the application. The package name
serves as a unique identifier for the application.
It describes the components of the application—the activities, services,
broadcast receivers, and content providers that the application is
composed of.
It names the Java classes that implement each of the components and
their capabilities. These declarations let the Android system know what
the components are and under what conditions they can be launched.
It determines which processes will host application components.
It declares which permissions the application must have in order to
access protected parts of the Android API and interact with other
applications.
It declares the permissions that other applications are required to have
in order to interact with the application's components.
It lists the Instrumentation classes that provide application code
profiling and other information as the application is running. These
declarations are present in the manifest only while the application is
being developed and tested; they're removed before the application is
published.
It declares the minimum level of the Android API that the application
requires.
It lists the libraries to which the application must be linked.

We visually inspected the manifest files of different applications to look for
similarities. A utility like WinMerge or Diff can be used to find matches between
two manifest files. We compared manifest files for different applications
OpenSudoku (Google Code, 2011d)0 and Andoku (Google Code, 2011a) and no
similarities were found. It is important to ignore similarities that are due to
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requirements of Android or are similar for reasons other than copying, such as
Android APIs (Software Analysis & Forensic Engineering Corp., 2012).
3.2 Resource Files
In addition to the manifest, a res directory of folders and files was also examined.
These files are resource files in XML format. The Android Developer
documentation describes the importance of using resources (Android Developers,
2012b):
You should always externalize resources such as images and strings
from your application code, so that you can maintain them
independently. Externalizing your resources also allows you to provide
alternative resources that support specific device configurations such
as different languages or screen sizes, which becomes increasingly
important as more Android-powered devices become available with
different configurations. In order to provide compatibility with
different configurations, you must organize resources in your project's
res/ directory, using various sub-directories that group resources by
type and configuration.
Altova’s DiffDog (Altova, 2012) utility made it easy to compare two res
directories side by side. The tool automatically aligns directories with the same
name and compares files with the same name. We compared resource files for the
applications OpenSudoku and Andoku and no similarities were found. Again it is
important to ignore similarities that are due to requirements of Android or are
similar for reasons other than copying.
3.3 Asset Files
The assets directory contains a hierarchical directory of files used by the program.
Asset files may be bitmapped images, HTML files, or any other type of file
needed by the application. Not all applications have asset files. For the example
applications, OpenSudoku had no asset files while Andoku did have asset files.
4. COMPARISON METHODOLOGY AND MEASUREMENTS
The bytecode for the application is found in the classes.dex file of the application
APK. There are two approaches we considered for comparing the source code of
one app to the bytecode of the downloaded app: 1) compare the bytecode form of
the downloaded app or 2) decompile the bytecode into source code and compare
the decompiled source code form of the downloaded app (Kalinovsky, 2004;
Paller, 2009; Schulman, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c). We decided to try both
approaches.
Selecting a tool to perform the comparisons was the next step.
4.1 Forensic Tool Selection
Working from bytecode means some information from the original source code
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will be lost, so a method to measure how much of the source code information is
retained in the bytecode is important. A tool capable of examining bytecode is
required. This requirement eliminated all but one of the forensic software analysis
tools that are commercially available1. CodeSuite® by SAFE Corporation is the
only tool that breaks down software into component elements and provides
metrics on each of the component elements and thereby measures a baseline for
source code coverage (Zeidman, 2006, 2008). It can also compare bytecode to
source code (Software Analysis & Forensic Engineering Corp., 2011).
4.2 Identifiability Metric
We wanted a measure that signifies how easily application code can be identified
after it has been compiled, because a goal of ours was to find out if a downloaded
application was copied from the original application’s source code. Some source
code elements such as identifiers and strings remain in bytecode after source code
is compiled into bytecode, while other source code elements such as statements
and comments are usually removed during compilation2. As a basis for an
identifiability measure we wanted to determine the percentage of source code
elements that remain in an application’s bytecode. We also wanted to decompile
bytecode back into source code and again determine the percentage of the source
code elements from the original source code that can be found in the resulting
decompiled source code.
4.2.1 Source code element metrics
Bob Zeidman previously defined a process for examining source code to find
copying that can be boiled down to: divide source code into basic elements, find
all matches between elements of different programs, and then filter out matches
that are not caused by copying (Zeidman, 2011). Based on this information, two
measures for the source code elements were taken, the first is how many total
elements exist and the second is how many of those elements are uncommon.
Uncommon elements are more helpful at determining the identifiability of the
application. Finding these uncommon elements in two different programs is a
strong indicator that one may have been copied from the other (Zeidman, 2006,
2008, 2011).
Obtaining these metrics for an application involves running two CodeSuite tools.
A CodeMatch® comparison of the application’s source code to itself gives a list
of all source code elements in the application. There are three types of elements
that we consider: comments and strings (str), identifiers (id), and statements
(stmt). The total number of source code elements of each type in a particular
11

Note that we required a software forensics tool not a digital forensics tool. Our analysis is not
about recovering data or determining the kind of data, but rather understanding the content of
the data. CodeSuite is one of the few tools that analyze software on this level. See The Software
IP Detective’s Handbook (Zeidman, 2011), Chapter 9, for further clarification.
2
A limitation of CodeMatch is that it lumps strings and comments together. For determining
identifiability it would be better to consider these two source code elements separately.
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application is represented as SE(str), SE(id), and SE(stmt). Running
SourceDetective® then determines the number of times each source code element
could be found on the Internet (“hits”). The Internet search hit count h is used to
qualify the counts. In Table 1, these totals returned from CodeMatch and
SourceDetective for the Android game OpenSudoku are shown. The numbers are
taken from spreadsheets generated by CodeSuite. In this case, elements with less
than 25 hits were considered uncommon and good potential indicators of copying,
and elements with 0 hits were considered unique. Future researchers may want to
test a different threshold than 25 hits for labeling a source code element as
uncommon, but this number worked well in these tests and in our experience.
Obviously an element that cannot be found elsewhere through an Internet search
(i.e., has 0 hits) is unique to that application.
CodeMatch Metrics

Total SE(str)
+ SE(id)
+SE(stmt)
5,913

Comment/
String
SE(str)
1,015

Identifier
SE(id)

Statement
SE(stmt)

Total
1,647
3,251
(SE)
Uncommon
3,599
684
431
2,484
(h < 25 hits) (SE25)
Unique
3,171
621
324
2,226
(h = 0 hits) (SE0)
Table 1: CodeMatch analysis results of OpenSudoku source

4.2.2 Baseline for comparing bytecode
Next another CodeSuite tool, BitMatch®, was run to compare the application’s
source code with its own bytecode file (classes.dex). Then SourceDetective was
run to generate the report of hits. This information is needed to create a baseline to
quantify our likelihood of identifying copied code because we cannot expect
better results comparing one application’s bytecode to another application’s
source code (or bytecode) than when comparing one application’s bytecode to its
own source code.
Because CodeSuite provides these metrics by element type, it is valuable to define
the identifiability metric by type as well as defining the total identifiability. There
are three types of elements that we consider: comments and strings (str),
identifiers (id), and statements (stmt)3. The number of source code elements that
are also found in the application’s bytecode are represented as BE(str), BE(id),
and BE(stmt). The bytecode identifiability IB is the number of elements that can
3

CodeMatch lumps comments and string together. Comments cannot be found in bytecode, so
we refer to them simply as strings. Also, BitMatch extracts some text that it cannot determine to
be strings or identifiers and so considers them to be both.
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be found in the application’s bytecode as a percentage of the total number of those
elements in the application’s source code. The Internet search hit count h is then
used to qualify both the element (BEh) and total (SEh) counts so that identifiability
can be determined for elements with h or fewer hits. Source code elements with
high hit counts do not help uniquely identify an application while those with low
hit counts do.
The formulas for calculating the identifiability of an application’s bytecode are:
IBh(str) = BEh(str)/SEh(str)
IBh(id) = BEh(id)/SEh(id)
IBh(stmt) = BEh(stmt)/SEh(stmt)
IBh= (BEh(str)+BEh(id)+BEh(stmt))/(SEh(str)+SEh(id)+SEh(stmt))
Table 2 shows the results for the analysis of the bytecode for the Android game
OpenSudoku. As expected, because the bytecode does not include statements or
comments from the source, the identifiability for statements was 0 and the
comment/string identifiability comes only from strings. However, the
identifiability for identifiers was high, which means that if code was copied, the
comparison of bytecode with source code is very likely to find the copying
(unless all of the identifiers were subsequently renamed). In addition, the
coverage of unique identifiers (~90%) means that the compiling and packaging
process did not eliminate many unique identifiers.
BitMatch Metrics
Total
String(str) Identifier(id)
Elements (BE)
1,513
227
1,286
Identifiability (IB)
25.6%
22.4%
78.1%
Uncommon matches (BE25)
443
44
399
Uncommon identifiability (IB25)
12.3%
6.4%
92.6%
Unique matches (BE0)
326
34
292
Unique identifiability (IB0)
10.3%
5.5%
90.1%
Table 2: BitMatch analysis results of comparison of OpenSudoku's classes.dex
with its source code

4.2.3 Baseline for comparing decompiled source with original source
We can measure the identifiability of the decompiled bytecode using the same
methodology by comparing the application’s source code to the source code
from its decompiled bytecode.
4.2.3.1 Converting classes.dex to a JAR file
To get source code from the bytecode dex file requires decompiling. The JD-GUI
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decompiler (Java Decompiler, 2012) was selected (see section 0 for more
information on the decompiler selection process). The decompiler works with
either a Java archive (JAR) file or bytecode class files. The free dex2jar utility
(Google Code, 2011c) was used to generate a JAR file from the classes.dex file.
4.2.3.2 Decompiling a JAR file
CodeMatch was used to compare the application’s original source code with its
decompiled source code. Then SourceDetective was run and decompiled code
identifiability metrics were calculated. The number of source code elements that
are also found in the application’s decompiled bytecode are represented as
DE(str), DE(id), and DE(stmt). The identifiability ID is the number of elements
that can be found in the application’s decompiled bytecode as a percentage of the
total number of those elements in the application’s original source code. The
Internet search hit count h is then used to qualify both the element (DEh) and total
(SEh) counts so that identifiability can be determined for elements with h or fewer
hits. Source code elements with high hit counts do not help uniquely identify an
application while those with low hit counts do.
The formulas for calculating the identifiability of an application’s decompiled
bytecode are:
IDh(str) = DEh(str)/SEh(str)
IDh(id) = DEh(id)/SEh(id)
IDh(stmt) = DEh(stmt)/SEh(stmt)
IDh = (DEh(str)+DEh(id)+DEh(stmt))/(SEh(str)+SEh(id)+SEh(stmt))

CodeMatch Metrics

Total

String
(str)
134
13.2%
52
7.6%

Identifier
(id)
1,267
76.9%
393
91.2%

Statement
(stmt)
430
13.2%
252
10.1%

Elements (SE)
1,831
Total Identifiability (ID)
31.0%
Uncommon matches (SE25)
697
Uncommon Identifiability
19.4%
(ID25)
Unique matches (SE0)
572
43
304
225
Unique Identifiability (ID0)
18.0%
6.9%
93.8%
10.1%
Table 3: CodeMatch analysis results comparing OpenSudoku decompiled
source code with its original source code

5. DECOMPILING ANDROID APPLICATIONS
Based on the results above it is clear the decompiler did not fully recreate the
source code, so we wondered how good is the decompiled code? Table 4 shows
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the results of compiling the source code generated by the JD-GUI decompiler for
three different applications. These results illustrate that the decompile process
often does not produce source code that can be compiled or executed.

App

Compiles?

Executes?

Hello World

Yes

Yes

Notepadv1

No

No

OpenSudoku

No

No

Table 4: Validate JD-GUI decompiled code by attempting to compile and run
Because the decompiled code from JD-GUI does not compile, it made sense to
look at other Java decompilers. The JAD decompiler (Varaneckas, 2001), another
popular open source Java decompiler, was also tested using the same three
applications. The results are shown in Table 5.

App

Compiles?

Executes?

Hello World

Yes

Yes

Notepadv1

No (warning class file version 50 not
supported, but generated Java files)

No

OpenSudoku

No (errors and crashed decompiling
CommandStack.class)

No

Table 5: Validate JAD decompiled code by attempting to compile and run
Based on this testing, while the JD-GUI decompiler didn’t produce compilable
code, it was selected because it was able to decompile all of the test cases while
JAD failed to generate code in 2 out of the 3 cases tested.
Is decompiling a useful technique for identifying copying when source code is
unavailable? The surprising result seen in Table 3 is that decompiling did improve
the total identifiability. Comparing an application’s source code with the source
code that is decompiled from a suspect application’s bytecode appears to be a
slightly better way to detect copying than to directly compare an application’s
source code to a suspect application’s bytecode. This is because bytecode
decompilation produces source code statements that can then be compared,
increasing the identifiability. And in general, being able to view source code will
give you a better understanding of the context of any matching source code
elements. The case study below can better illustrate how decompiling helps.
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6. CASE STUDY: COMPARING DIFFERENT ANDROID SUDOKU
APPLICATIONS
To illustrate the comparison methodology, we selected a variety of Android
Sudoku applications for a case study. The Android Sudoku applications chosen
were:
 Andoku
 Sudoku_bomb
 Enjoy Sudoku
 Mobile Sudoku
 Standard Sudoku
 Sudoku UI
Each of these was compared with OpenSudoku, the application used in the source
code element coverage measures (see Section 0).
6.1 Bytecode to Source Code Comparison
The table below details the number of source code element matches found when
comparing an application’s bytecode with OpenSudoku’s application source code.
Table 6 identifies application Andoku as having uncommon string and identifier
matches with application OpenSudoku. The matched elements are listed in the
CodeSuite report and shown in Table 7.
Because these elements are not commonly used—based upon Internet searches—
the next step is to identify where they occur in the OpenSudoku application
source code and how they are used. Searching the OpenSudoku source files for all
occurrences of the elements shows that the matches occur in important files or
code segments.
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Application

Total
element
matches4

String matches
total/uncommon/
unique

Identifier matches
total/uncommon/
unique

Andoku

329

22 / 1 / 0

325 / 4 / 1

Sudoku_bomb

227

6/0/0

226 / 0 / 0

EnjoySudoku

387

14 / 0 / 0

384 / 0 / 0

Mobile37Sudoku

182

5/0/0

180 / 0 / 0

StandardSudoku

266

14 / 0 / 0

264 / 0 / 0

Sudoku.ui

204

12 / 0 / 0

202 / 0 / 0

Table 6: BitMatch results for app bytecode to OpenSudoku source code
Matching program elements

Search hits

Strings
bad menuInfo

21

Identifiers
DIALOG_RESET_PUZZLE

0

DIALOG_DELETE_FOLDER

1

EXTRA_FOLDER_ID

1

insertFolder

21

Table 7: OpenSudoku to Andoku uncommon matches
The string “bad menuInfo” is used in the OpenSudoku source code for error
messaging.
The identifier “DIALOG_RESET_PUZZLE” is used in the OpenSudoku source
code in a switch statement that controls the appearance of different dialogs based
on a user’s action.
The identifier “EXTRA_FOLDER_ID” is found fifteen times in five different
OpenSudoku source code files, all within the GUI.
This collection of information provides compelling evidence of possible copying
between Andoku and OpenSudoku because it identifies matches in a number of
different code files. Next the decompiled code is used to provide more context to
this possible copying.
4

Note that the total elements is less than the sum of string elements and identifier elements due
to some elements being in both categories because BitMatch cannot be certain whether a single
word is an identifier or string.
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6.2 Decompiled Bytecode to Source Code Comparison
Table 8 shows the decompiled code results for all the applications. The analysis
identifies Andoku with uncommon element matches.

App tested

Total
Elements

String
matches
total/uncom/
unique

Identifier
matches
total/uncom/
unique

Statement
matches
total/uncom/
unique

Andoku

468

10 / 1 / 0

376 / 5 / 1

82 / 1 / 0

Sudoku_bomb

300

2/0/0

247 / 0 / 0

51 / 1 /0

EnjoySudoku

417

3/0/0

337 / 0 / 0

77 / 1 / 0

Mobile37Sudoku

287

4/0/0

224 / 0 / 0

59 / 0 / 0

StandardSudoku

294

2/0/0

240 / 0 / 0

52 / 0 / 0

Sudoku.ui

363

7/0/0

296 / 0 / 0

60 / 1 / 0

Table 8: CodeMatch results for comparing OpenSudoku source code to
decompiled source code
In Table 9, the uncommon matches found between the Andoku decompiled byte
code and OpenSudoku source code are listed.

Matching program elements

Search hits

Strings
bad menuInfo

21

Identifiers
DIALOG_RESET_PUZZLE

0

DIALOG_DELETE_FOLDER

1

EXTRA_FOLDER_ID

1

FolderListActivity

1

insertFolder

21

Statements
Import android.widget.SimpleCursorAdapter.ViewBinder

22

Table 9: Uncommon matches between OpenSudoku and Andoku
A comparison of OpenSudoku source code with Andoku decompiled source code
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was performed. Even though close examination of the decompiled code revealed
a functional error that would prevent the code from executing, the string “bad
menuInfo” matched, the file name matched, the class name matched, and the
method name matched, indicating that these two code segments have significant
similarity.
We downloaded the actual Andoku source code (Google Code, 2011a) and found
it to be nearly identical to the OpenSudoku source, thereby validating what our
code analysis had flagged.
The other matched items from Table 9 also identified segments of code with
copying. The additional information that the decompiled code provided gave
context to the matched elements, offering more compelling evidence of copying.
7. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we defined an identifiability metric for a software application that
can give a developer an idea of how easy or difficult it is to identify bytecode as
being derived from an application’s source code. A high identifiability means it
will be easier to detect that another application was derived from or copied from
the application. A low identifiability means that an application's trade secrets are
better hidden.
In this paper, the viability of analyzing Android applications to discover possible
copyright infringement without access to source code is demonstrated. The code
comparison techniques identified uncommon element matches, offering
developers an effective solution to identify code copying. The surprising result
was that it was slightly more effective to use decompiled bytecode rather than
bytecode in the comparison. It seems that decompiling puts information back into
the code that is in the bytecode but difficult to identify.
While any evidence uncovered without access to source code may be compelling
enough to convince a judge that there is reason for litigation, gaining access to
source is ultimately needed to prove the extent of the copying. Because the
techniques demonstrated apply to code that has been compiled and information
has thus been removed, they do not cover 100% of the source code elements, and
thus not finding any uncommon element matches does not disprove copying.
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